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Abstract
Banking regulation has proven to be inadequate to guard systemic stability in the recent
ﬁnancial crisis. Central banks have provided liquidity and ministries of ﬁnance have set up
rescue programmes to restore conﬁdence and stability. Using a model of a systemic bank suf-
fering from liquidity shocks, we ﬁnd that the unregulated bank keeps too much liquidity and
takes excessive risk compared to the social optimum. A Lender of Last Resort can alleviate
the liquidity problem, but induces moral hazard. Therefore, we introduce a ﬁscal authority
that is able to bail out the bank by injecting capital. This authority faces a trade-oﬀ: when
it imposes strict bailout conditions, investment increases but moral hazard ensues. Milder
bailout conditions reduce excessive risk taking at the expense of investment. This resembles
the current situation on ﬁnancial markets, in which banks take less risk but also provide less
credit to the economy.
JEL Classiﬁcation: E58, G21, G28
Keywords: Bank Regulation, Lender of Last Resort, Liquidity, Capital, Bailout
∗The authors thank Wolf Wagner and Fabio Castiglionesi for helpful comments.
†CentER and European Banking Center, Tilburg University. E-mail: r.g.m.nijskens@uvt.nl
‡CentER and European Banking Center, Tilburg University and CEPR. E-mail: s.c.w.eijﬃnger@uvt.nl
11 Introduction
The ﬁnancial crisis of the last two years has shown that banking regulation has not been adequate
to safeguard the stability of the ﬁnancial system. While prudential regulation such as the Basel II
capital requirements has allowed for regulatory arbitrage, the existence of a lender of last resort
has been insuﬃcient to deter banks from taking risks that are harmful to the ﬁnancial system.
As a result, central banks around the world had to provide substantial amounts of liquidity to
alleviate liquidity shortages and to prevent the interbank market from breaking down completely.
They have provided this liquidity on very generous terms, letting virtually every bank access their
facilities. Therefore, although Bagehot (1873) already argued that insolvent banks should not
be provided with liquidity, many banks that received assistance were in fact insolvent. However,
as they posed a risk for the ﬁnancial system as a whole, regulators had no choice but to save
them. This suggests that the Too-Big-to-Fail problem still exists, although many now call it a
Too-Connected-to-Fail problem: the interlinkages between banks are so dense that contagion of
bank failures has become inevitable (Nijskens and Wagner, 2008).
Furthermore, to prevent a complete failure of the ﬁnancial system governments have con-
structed very large rescue packages additional to central bank liquidity. Halfway through 2009,
the amount of resources committed in these packages lay around e5 trillion or 18:8% of GDP for
11 large western countries1, whereas actual outlays amounted to e2 trillion (Panetta et al., 2009).
The rescue measures comprise capital injections into banks, all-out nationalizations, explicit guar-
antees on bank lending and purchases of troubled assets. This large-scale intervention has turned
out to be absolutely necessary to restore conﬁdence and stability.
To provide a correct assessment of crisis management after large systemic shocks, we need to
consider thoroughly what has happened. In managing the current crisis, the central bank (as a
provider of liquidity) and the ﬁscal authorities (by providing capital or guarantees) have worked
together very closely. It is thus imperative to perform a simultaneous analysis of liquidity provision
and solvency regulation. Furthermore, we need to consider large, systemically relevant banks and
examine their interaction with both the central bank and the ﬁscal authorities. Our analytical
model will incorporate two principles voiced regarding lender of last resort practices. One is the
abovementioned principle of Bagehot, stating that central banks should only provide liquidity
to solvent banks. The other is the idea that bailout assistance (e.g. capital injections or loan
guarantees) should be costly for banks (Eijﬃnger, 2008), as they must be punished for threatening
ﬁnancial stability.
The results of our analysis indicate that having solely a Lender of Last Resort (LLR), in the
1Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Spain, Switzerland, the United Kingdom
and the United States.
2form of a central bank providing liquidity, can decrease excessive liquidity hoarding relative to the
case without an LLR. However, having a safety net also leads to engagement in moral hazard by
banks: they take excessive risks.
To alleviate this problem the safety net can be extended to comprise also capital provision. We
allow this capital provision to be costly to mitigate a possible moral hazard eﬀect. Ultimately we
ﬁnd that the regulators face a trade-oﬀ. On the one hand, making capital assistance very costly for
the bank increases productive investment, but also increases excessive risk taking. On the other,
relatively less costly capital assistance decreases moral hazard at the expense of investment.
This reﬂects the current situation in the ﬁnancial world: due to bailout assistance by govern-
ments, banks are facing harsher funding requirements and can thus extend less credit for risky
investment. However, the risks they are taking are less excessive than before the crisis.
In what follows, we will ﬁrst provide a short overview of existing literature on LLR and solvency
regulation in section 2. Our model will be described in section 3, while section 4 presents the
analytical results derived from this model. Section 5 concludes.
2 Related literature on LLR policy and solvency
The academic literature on the Lender of Last Resort (LLR), especially the part also considering
solvency (or closure) decisions, is quite modest in size. Interest in this topic has increased since
the United States’ Savings and Loans (S&L) crisis in the 1980’s. The literature has since focused
on the role of the Central Bank (CB) as an LLR to prevent and manage crises, and on the role of
the CB and other institutions in taking care of an orderly solution for bank failures. Of course,
the current ﬁnancial crisis has stimulated research in this area and we are bound to see many more
research eﬀorts in the near future.
The result of two decades of research on LLR and closure policy has been nicely documented
by Freixas and Parigi (2008). They start by mentioning the classic Bagehot (1873) principle,
which has been a starting point of analysis for many authors: the LLR should provide liquidity
to illiquid, but solvent banks at a penalty rate and against good collateral. They then note that
banking has become much more complex since 1873, causing problems such as the inability to dis-
tinguish liquidity from solvency problems (Goodhart, 1987). They also address interbank market
imperfections, moral hazard caused by penalty rates, the increasing diﬃculty in determining the
quality of collateral and the change of the banking system in general. The authors end with the
recommendation that we should not solely look at the role of the LLR but rather study "what
architecture of prudential regulation, risk supervision, monetary policy, deposit insurance and ELA
is best to guarantee ﬁnancial stability".
3The selection of literature we consider has addressed most abovementioned complexities sepa-
rately. We intend to bring some of them together in our analysis, as described at the end of this
section.
One striking comment on Bagehot’s LLR view is the idea that the CB should be ambiguous
about liquidity provision, meaning that the bank cannot always expect the CB to provide liquidity
when it is needed. Instead, the bank will face some uncertainty about whether it will receive
liquidity, and will face requirements on funding. This so-called "creative ambiguity" doctrine
is analyzed by among others Freixas (1999), Goodhart and Huang (1999), Repullo (2005) and
Cordella and Yeyati (2003), with contrasting results. While Freixas (1999) ﬁnds that ambiguity
may have its merits in some cases (by reducing moral hazard), he also provides a rationale for a
Too-Big-to-Fail (TBTF) policy. When banks are large, the social cost of their bankruptcy is too
high and the CB will always assist them with liquidity; a practice that is detrimental to welfare if
the bank is insolvent. Essentially the same result is found by Goodhart and Huang (1999). They
ﬁnd a justiﬁcation for ambiguity, although the optimal degree of ambiguity decreases strongly in
bank size. This ultimately leads to a TBTF policy motivated by contagion concerns.
Repullo (2005) ﬁnds a similar result regarding excessive risk taking: certainty about liquidity
provision does not increase moral hazard, although banks hold too little liquidity in this case. The
introduction of penalty rates, however, does cause moral hazard. This is motivated by arguing
that penalty rates decrease the expected return in the illiquid state. The bank tries to oﬀset this
by taking a higher risk, thereby increasing its return in the good state.
Cordella and Yeyati (2003) also conclude that moral hazard is not suﬃcient to justify criticism
on standard LLR policies. They argue that the possible moral hazard eﬀect of having an LLR is
compensated by an increase in charter value. This increase is generated by the CB’s commitment
to an unambiguous LLR policy, conditional on an aggregate macroeconomic shock and some "good
practice" conditions on funding.
Rochet (2004) explores this further by letting the bank choose its riskiness under an optimal
regime of prudential regulation. Here, riskiness is measured by the exposure to aggregate macroe-
conomic shocks. He ﬁnds that banks with an exposure above a certain threshold are perceived as
too risky and should not receive liquidity assistance. However, he also ﬁnds a time inconsistency
in providing liquidity assistance, leading to ex post regulatory forbearance.
Regulatory forbearance occurs after a macroeconomic shock reminds of the regulatory response
to the current ﬁnancial crisis, and the concepts used to justify this: systemic risk and contagion.
Although we do not explicitly model these phenomena, systemic risk is implied in our analysis
and we thus review shortly the literature on this topic. Freixas et al. (2000) have been among the
4ﬁrst to model systemic risk, in the interbank market. The interbank market can reduce the cost
of holding liquid reserves, which banks need to satisfy uncertain consumption demand. However,
coordination failures in this market can lead to a gridlock, which may lead to ineﬃcient closure
of solvent banks. Moreover, money center banks may not be allowed to fail as their failure might
lead to contagion. This resembles the "too-connected-to-fail" problem that has also manifested in
the current crisis.
Recently, Acharya and Yorulmazer (2007, 2008) have explicitly considered interlinkages be-
tween banks that invest in similar projects. If the correlation between these projects is low, it is
possible that only a few banks fail when some projects yield a low return. These may be taken over
by the surviving ones, who may receive CB liquidity for this purpose. However, if correlation is
high and many banks fail, there are not enough surviving banks that can purchase assets. The CB
thus has to choose whether to bail them out or liquidate them, which can be very costly because
of asset speciﬁcity. This leads again to a time inconsistency problem, as the CB cannot credibly
commit ex ante to not bail out these banks. The authors call this a "too-many-to-fail" problem,
related to the correlation between banks’ investments in the current ﬁnancial system.
Although the models discussed above can explain several phenomena present in the ﬁnancial
system, they also suﬀer from one deﬁciency: they focus mainly on the central bank as a lender of
last resort, which provides liquidity assistance up to a certain threshold. However, the bank may
still be solvent, although the central bank does not have enough information to judge this; banks
may be ineﬃciently closed. Furthermore, as described above and noted by e.g. Boot and Thakor
(1993) and Rochet (2004), the inability to discriminate between liquidity and solvency problems
can lead to regulatory forbearance: insolvent banks are allowed to stay open.
Freixas et al. (2004) thoroughly examine indistinguishable liquidity and solvency problems.
They explicitly model liquidity and solvency shocks separately, thereby assuming that the CB
cannot determine ex ante whether the bank is only illiquid or also insolvent. Their main ﬁnding is
that a CB providing LLR support is optimal when insolvent banks are not detected, it is costly for
banks to screen borrowers and interbank market spreads are high. This resembles crisis episodes
(such as the recent one) with ineﬃcient supervision.
In Rochet and Vives (2004), the same problem does not stem from failing supervision, but is
caused by coordination failures between market participants. In their case, participants in the in-
terbank market cannot distinguish between illiquid and insolvent banks. Below a certain threshold
for bank fundamentals, participants in the interbank market are not willing to lend to the bank
anymore. Although the bank may still be solvent in this case, the interbank market will see it as
insolvent. This suggests a role for LLR policy by the CB, which should be complemented with
prompt corrective action to implement the incentive-eﬃcient solution.
5To incorporate this notion, some authors have considered explicitly the co-existence of multiple
regulators (with diﬀerent responsibilities regarding liquidity and solvency) in the banking system.
Repullo (2000), for instance, suggests a model of a bank suﬀering liquidity shocks that requires
LLR borrowing. His model is based on the literature of incomplete contracts. It contains two
regulatory agencies with diﬀerent preferences, namely the central bank and the deposit insurance
fund (DIF), that may provide this liquidity using nonveriﬁable information. Under the assumption
that the allocation of liquidity can be made contingent on the size of the shock, he ﬁnds that in
case of small shocks the CB should be the LLR, and the DIF should fulﬁl this role in case of large
shocks.
Kahn and Santos (2005) extend this model signiﬁcantly by considering closure authority in
addition to liquidity decisions. This allows for a distinction between illiquidity and insolvency
and for examining how regulator’s information incentives are inﬂuenced by the institutional al-
location. They ﬁnd that having only one regulator deciding on both LLR and closure leads to
excessive forbearance and suboptimal bank investment. Like Repullo (2000), they also ﬁnd that
multiple regulators may improve the situation, especially when supervision is allocated to the DIF.
However, at low levels of liquidity shortage the forbearance problem may be exacerbated.
Additional to having two regulatory bodies, it is argued that capital provision may complement
liquidity provision and help to solve the problem of ineﬃcient closure. Diamond and Rajan (2005),
for instance, have set up a general equilibrium model in which an endogenous liquidity problem
occurs as entrepreneurs need to reﬁnance their projects (Holmstrom and Tirole, 1998). This leads
to an aggregate liquidity shortage, which the CB can partly alleviate. Furthermore, they ﬁnd
that a capital injection may make insolvent banks solvent again, improving their ability to raise
liquidity. They also note that this intervention does not work when the bank is fundamentally
insolvent, in line with Bagehot’s principle: genuinely insolvent banks should not receive liquidity.
Building on this body of literature, we acknowledge that there are indeed often two diﬀerent
authorities responsible for ﬁnancial crisis management. These authorities have a division of tasks,
where the central bank is generally responsible for liquidity provision and a ﬁscal authority (Trea-
sury or Ministry of Finance) has to decide whether the bank receives a capital injection or not.
We will argue that the existence of a ﬁscal authority beside a central bank may reduce excessive
risk taking. The model with which we show this slightly resembles that of Repullo (2005). We
take a similar game theoretic approach, but we introduce an additional regulatory authority into
the model. Our model will be explained in the next section.
63 The Model
Let us consider an economy with risk-neutral agents and three dates: t = 0;1;2. In this economy,
there is one (systemically important) bank that collects deposits and has some equity capital; it
operates under limited liability. The economy also contains two regulatory agencies: a central
bank (CB) fulﬁlling the role of Lender of Last Resort (LLR) and a ﬁscal authority that, in case
of a bank failure, has to decide on the failure resolution procedure.
The bank’s size is equal to one2, and its balance sheet looks as follows:
I + M = E + D (1)





RH > 1 with probability p
RL < 1 with probability 1 − p
p ∈ [0;1] is the success probability of investment, increasing in the eﬀorts of the bank to monitor
this investment. Expected return E( ~ R) is greater than 1, and investments are illiquid in the sense
that they cannot be sold before t = 2. The other item on the asset side is M, holdings of liquid
assets. These are called "liquid" since they represent investment in a storage technology, which
provides a riskless return of RM = 1 per unit of M. This implies that the riskless interest rate in
our model is equal to 0.
On the liability side we ﬁrst equity and deposits. Equity capital E comes from the bank owner,
who operates under limited liability. Deposits D are fully insured, and yield a return RD = 1 at
t = 2 since they are riskless. To abstract completely from deposit insurance issues, we assume
that the bank pays no deposit insurance premium.
We will further assume that I > E, to give the bank owner the opportunity to work with
leverage. This assumption reﬂects that holding liquidity may be too costly as it foregoes po-
tential returns on I (Rochet and Vives, 2004). It is thus proﬁtable for the bank owner to invest
the bank’s funds in the risky asset (as E( ~ R) ≥ 1). These proﬁts will be even ampliﬁed when I > E.
2Since we have assumed that there is only one bank and thus bank failure is costly for society, we may abstract
from letting bank size determine bank closure policy.
3Note that all returns in our model are gross returns.
7Finally, to simplify our analysis, we will introduce the following assumptions on p and R:
RL = 0; RH = R(p); (2)
R′(p) < 0; R′′(p) ≤ 0; (3)
R(1) ≥ 1; R(1) + R′(1) < 0; (4)
E( ~ R) ≥ 1 (5)
This return function is also used by Repullo (2005), Allen and Gale (2000) and Cordella and Yeyati
(2003), and implies that E( ~ R) = pR(p) will be maximized at ^ p ∈ (0;1) where R(^ p) + ^ pR′(^ p) =
0. The assumptions on the function thus suﬃce for an interior maximum4. Given the above
assumptions we can write down bank value at t = 2 as follows:
V2 = p[R(p)I + M − D] (6)
This expression will be modiﬁed in the next section.
3.1 A liquidity shock
In its operation, the bank is subject to liquidity shocks. A liquidity shock, consisting of depositors
withdrawing a fraction x of their deposits, occurs at date t = 15. x is uniformly distributed on
the interval (0;1) with cumulative density F(x) = x and probability density f(x) = 1. The size
of the shock is public information when it occurs at t = 1. Taking into account that we have two
regulatory agencies, we can distinguish three cases (similar to Rochet and Vives (2004)):
1. x ≤ M
D = x, with probability x: the liquidity shock can be resolved using liquid reserves.
2. x < x ≤ x with probability x − x: the bank is illiquid and will apply for emergency lending
at the LLR. x will be determined below.
3. x < x with probability 1 − x: the solvency of the bank is insuﬃcient to warrant LLR
borrowing and the ﬁscal authority will have to take a closure/continuation decision.
In case 1, the shock is small and the bank can repay the withdrawn deposits using its liquid
reserves M. Note that we assume there is no interbank market; the bank’s only liquidity comes
4Note that, for p = 0,
dpR(p)
dp = R(0) > 0 and, for p = 1, R(1) + R′(1) < 0. The second order condition for a
maximum is
d2pR(p)
dp2 = 2R′(p) + pR′′(p) < 0 for all p > 0. This suﬃces for an interior maximum at ^ p.
5Taking the credit crisis as a reference point, this kind of liquidity shock is very similar to investors in asset-
backed securities selling their claims back to the bank. Banks were obliged to return the money, which led to severe
liquidity problems. We can see this as analogous to deposit withdrawals.
8from the amount of liquid reserves it has kept at t = 06.
In case 2, when x < x < x, the bank cannot ﬁnance the liquidity shortage by itself, so it has
to apply for emergency liquidity from the LLR at an amount of xD − M. The LLR will ask a
repayment rate equal to 1 (there is no penalty rate) at t = 2 and will only lend to solvent banks.
In fulﬁlling its role of LLR, the central bank (CB) will want to minimize the social cost of
a bank’s risk taking. This is reﬂected in the bankruptcy cost C, which will be realized if the
bank fails. The CB will therefore provide liquidity up until a certain threshold7. This follows
from the generally accepted principle stated by Bagehot (1873): central banks should not lend to
banks that are both illiquid and insolvent. In determining this so-called solvency threshold, the
CB takes into account an expected cost of (1 − p)[C + (xD − M)] when it supports the bank
with emergency liquidity. When it does not support the bank, the CB incurs the certain loss C.
In these expressions,  is the weight the regulator attaches to the bankruptcy cost. This can be
interpreted as the political or reputational cost to the central bank and is assumed to be greater
than zero8.
Comparing the two above expressions we can deduce the solvency threshold for the CB at
t = 1, denoted by x::









Otherwise stated: the bank will apply for an amount of xD−M and the CB will only provide
liquidity when (7) holds. This means that the certain cost of a bank failure at t = 1 is greater than
the expected cost of failure at t = 2. In this case the bank is considered to be solvent (x ≤ x), but
illiquid.
Therefore, when x > x, the bank cannot borrow from the LLR (case 3). A bank failure will
occur, and the bank will enter into a prompt corrective action programme by the ﬁscal authority
(FA). A bailout from the FA is needed to continue the bank’s business, and the FA will require a
certain repayment that is potentially costly for the bank owner.
In a bailout, the FA has to provide an amount of funds equal to xD − M to make the bank
solvent; we will call these funds "capital". The FA then decides upon the conditions on which this
6This assumption can be justiﬁed since we are focusing on crisis management. In the current ﬁnancial crisis
the interbank market nearly broke down (Allen et al., 2009; Diamond and Rajan, 2009). Massive intervention by
central banks seemed to be the only way to get it going again.
7Depositors get D back in case of insolvency, but this is dealt with by the DIF (a separate authority). We
assume that the deposit insurance is not part of the loss functions.
8 > 1 in Kahn and Santos (2005), but Repullo (2000) assumes  < 1 and Repullo (2005) assumes  = 1. We
will not yet make any assumptions other than  > 0. The same holds for  in the case of the ﬁscal authority.
9capital will be provided. These are meant to discipline the bank owner for taking too much risk
and letting the bank become insolvent, and will consist of the regulator determining the amount
of gains it appropriates from the bank. The FA will require a share  of bank value at t = 2 in
case of success, and will incur the bankruptcy cost C in case of failure. However, when the it
does not provide assistance, it will incur the cost C with certainty.
The FA will then choose the repayment  such that it at least breaks even in expectation:
 ≥
xD − M − pC
p[(R(p) − 1)I + E]
(8)
where  is the weight the FA attaches to the cost of bankruptcy in the same vein as the CB’s .
Note, however, that these weights may diﬀer for the CB and the FA. This reﬂects the political
relation between the CB and the FA; they may have diﬀerent responsibilities regarding ﬁnancial
stability.
This possibility of bailout, with a required period 2 return of , is a stylized representation
of the situation in which a bank is nationalized, recapitalized or provided with guarantees on its
borrowing. These measures have been used extensively in crisis management during the last 2
years. Of course, these measures have not been free for banks: regulators have set a premium on
the rates to be paid for access to these facilities, as the government has taken over part of the risk
from the bank. This is epitomized by the  in our model, which may contain the abovementioned
risk premium. Bailout assistance thus comes at a cost for the bank owner.
3.2 The bank’s objective
Taking the liquidity shock and the regulatory system into account, the bank owner will maximize
total bank value at t = 2. The bank operates with an exogenously given capital structure (following
Wagner (2007)), consisting of positive amounts of both equity and deposits. The choice variables
for the bank owner are the eﬀort put into monitoring, embodied in the probability of success p,
and the amount of investment I. This investment is productive, meaning that it is desirable for
the economy to allocate funds to it (since E( ~ R) > 1). The probability of success, which increases
with monitoring eﬀort at t = 0, is the inverse of the amount of risk taken.
Using the properties of the liquidity shock and the aforementioned conditions x and  set by
the regulatory authorities, we can reﬁne the bank’s objective function. We assume that there is
no time discounting. Let us ﬁrst write down the bank owner’s t = 2 payoﬀ, denoted by   V2, in the
10diﬀerent scenarios:
  V2 =

    
    
V L
2 (p) = p[R(p)I + M − D] w.p. x
V M
2 (p) = p[R(p)I − (1 − x)D − (xD − M)] w.p. x − x
V H
2 (p) = (1 − )p[R(p)I + M − D] w.p. 1 − x
where "w.p." means "with probability" and the subscripts denote the magnitude of the shock:




E(   V (p;I)2) = p[R(p)I + M − D][1 − (1 − x)]
}
(9)
The fact that expected bank value is not only varying with p, but also with x and , indicates
that it depends on the choices made by the bank owner as well as those made by the regulators.
In the next section we will characterize this interdependence.
4 Liquidity or liquidation
To summarize the previous sections, we can systematically go through the sequence of events.
Following Repullo (2005), we let the bank simultaneously choose its risk p (determined by its
monitoring eﬀort) and its portfolio of risky investments I at t = 0, taking into account the
possibility of liquidity shocks at t = 1 and responses by the CB and the FA.
At t = 1, the liquidity shock realizes and it is observable. If x ≤ x, the bank pays depositors
out of its liquidity reserves. If x < x ≤ x, the bank applies for liquidity and the CB will provide
it. Finally, if x > x, the CB is not willing to provide liquidity and the FA will take action. This
will lead to a required repayment , which depends in turn on the amounts of investment and
monitoring chosen by the bank at t = 0.
4.1 First Best
As a benchmark, we ﬁrst analyze the socially eﬃcient solution to the problem of choosing optimal
investment and risk taking. In the ﬁrst best case, there is a central planner who chooses risk,
investment and the regulatory instruments such that the social value of bank investments is max-
imized. The gains to society are the total value of bank investments at t = 2 minus the value of
investments.
11The central planner’s problem is:
max
p;I
p[(R(p) − 1)I + M] + (1 − p)[M − I] (10)
As we have assumed E( ~ R) = pR(p) > 1, this function is strictly increasing in I and it is optimal
to set I equal to 1. Furthermore, the derivative of (10) w.r.t. p is [R(p) − pR′(p)]I. The optimal
quantities of p and I are thus given by:
R(pfb) + pfbR′(pfb) = 0 (11)
Ifb = 1 (12)
which means that pfb is such that equation (11) is satisﬁed. It is optimal to set M = 0 and invest
all funds into the risky asset I; with this knowledge, monitoring eﬀort (and thus p) is chosen to
maximize the expected return on these investments.
Of course the central planner/regulator takes into account the full social value when setting a
solvency threshold for liquidity provision. The threshold rule will thus be determined by comparing
the expected cost of providing liquidity, which is (1 − p)(C + (xD − M)) − p(R(p)I − (xD − M))






which says that the bank only fails when its expected return on investment at t = 2 plus the possible
bankruptcy costs is less than the liquidity shock. As x ∈ (0;1), xD ≤ Ifb and pfbR(pfb) ≥ 1,
we see that this threshold is larger than 1 and thus not binding. The bank will always get a
liquidity injection from the government in the ﬁrst best scenario: socially optimal risk taking and
investment justify unconditional liquidity assistance.
4.2 Bank optimization without regulation
Let us now consider the case of a private bank choosing an optimal portfolio, and analyze whether
it reaches the ﬁrst best allocation.
We assume that there are no regulatory authorities, such as a Lender of Last Resort or a ﬁscal
authority, which may provide assistance. There is also no interbank market, as mentioned above.
The bank thus has to cope with liquidity shocks on its own, which means that the bank fails if
12x > x ≡ M
D , i.e. when the sudden demand for liquidity is larger than the bank’s liquid assets. In
case of failure, the returns at t = 2 are zero, since eﬀectively  = 1 when there is no FA. The bank
thus maximizes the following expected bank value of (where we have replaced M − D by E − I):
E(   V (p;I)2) = p[(R(p) − 1)I + E][x] (14)
The bank simultaneously chooses optimal values p = pn and I = In. We can analyze the decision
process by ﬁrst letting the bank choose pn, assuming I is already at its optimum In; subsequently,
the bank chooses In taking pn as given. The choice of pn is given by the following ﬁrst order
condition (FOC), replacing M by 1 − I:
R(pn) + pnR′(pn) = 1 −
E
In (15)
which holds since I < 1: if I = 1, x = 0 and the bank would always fail. The bank would thus
choose In < 1 to receive a positive payoﬀ at t = 2. The optimal pn also satisﬁes the second order





In [2R′(pn) + pnR′′(pn)] < 0 (16)










where we have used
@x
@I = − 1










where we have used
@
2x
@I2 = 0. We can deduce from equations (15) and (17) that the bank takes
more risk than is desirable from a social perspective. This follows from our assumption that the
bank invests with leverage (i.e. D > M > 0), which means In > E and thus R(pn)+pnR′(pn) > 0.
As E
In < 1 and R(pn) + pnR′(pn) is decreasing in p, we see that pn < pfb.
Furthermore, we can state that In < Ifb, which follows from assuming that E > 0 and
R(pn) > 1 (otherwise it would not be proﬁtable to invest in the risky asset):








− 1 < 0 (19)
The bank owner thus generates too little productive (but risky) investment compared to the ﬁrst
13best case, and takes too much risk while doing so. The investment decision follows from the
assumption that there is no safety net in the form of a central bank able to provide emergency
liquidity; the bank has to reserve part of its funds to cope with liquidity shocks. As it has to keep
more liquidity on its balance sheet, the bank tries to make up for the foregone investment returns
by taking more risk. This means the bank owner "gambles" for a higher return in the case of
success, which is harmful to social welfare.
4.3 Introducing a Lender of Last Resort
It may be possible to improve the situation, by setting up a central bank (CB) that can provide
temporary liquidity to an illiquid bank. The bank owner then chooses risk-taking and the amount
of investment in this new situation by setting p and I, with equilibrium values pl and Il (where l
denotes that we are dealing with the possibility of liquidity provision). As in Repullo (2005) and
Kahn and Santos (2005), bank and CB play a simultaneous Nash game of incomplete information
in the determination of p and x. In this game, the CB can only observe the choice of I when it
has to make a liquidity provision decision at t = 1; this observation of I is not veriﬁable. The
CB does not know the choice of p at this moment. However, the CB can form a belief about pl










with equilibrium value xl = x(pl;Il). This threshold shows that the CB only faces downside risk;
the bank gets the upside. We can also see that the threshold depends only on the bank’s actual
choice of I; it doesn’t change directly with the actual choice of p. Instead, it is determined by pl,
the equilibrium value of p.
Furthermore, if x > x the bank ﬁnds itself in a crisis situation and it will be taken over com-
pletely by the ﬁscal authority. The depositors will be compensated by the DIF, and the remaining
parts of the bank will be sold by the FA at t = 2:  = 19. The bank owner will thus get a zero
return in this case; we will relax this assumption in the next section.
At t = 0, the bank will take all this into account while choosing p and I. It maximizes the new
objective function
E(   V (p;I)2) = p[(R(p) − 1)I + E][xl] (21)
taking into account the equilibrium decision by the CB. The corresponding FOC w.r.t. p and I
9Note that this is equivalent to taking over, recapitalizing and selling the bank.
14are:













where we can see that pl and Il are determined in a similar way as pn and In.
However, we also see that In ̸= Il when  > 0 and C > 0, which means that xl > x. To
determine the relative size of In and Il, we note that a decrease in  means that the Central Bank
cares very little about bank failure. This leads to very little liquidity injections: the equilibrium
threshold xl will fall towards x. Analogously, when  = 0 the CB will never intervene as it will not
incur any political cost from failure. This is equivalent to the earlier situation without a Lender
of Last Resort. It is thus straightforward to perform comparative statics regarding  by taking







1 − pl > 0 (24)
This expression indicates that Il decreases when  decreases: Il → In when  → 0. This means
that Il > In, or that an introduction of a Lender of Last Resort leads to an increase in productive
investment.
However, regulation is also established to mitigate risk taking. Let us therefore analyze whether
the riskiness of the bank has improved, by comparing pl with pn. To this end, we can totally








[2R′(pl) + pLR′′(pl)]Il < 0 (25)
where the inequality holds because of the assumptions on R(p). As we have found that Il > In,
we must also conclude that pl < pn because of equation (25).
The bank, in equilibrium, thus invests more in risky assets than in the situation without a
liquidity provider, which is a positive development. However, it also takes more risks when doing
so, which is worse from a social point of view. This may reﬂect a moral hazard eﬀect caused by
the introduction of a safety net: since there is a Lender of Last Resort that comes to the rescue
when an intermediate liquidity shock occurs, the bank takes more risk.
To illustrate this phenomenon, we have calibrated our model using reasonable parameter values.
15We have speciﬁed the returns as a concave decreasing function of p, namely R(p) = 3 − 2p2
(satisfying the assumptions from section 3.2), and the cost of bankruptcy is set to 0:10 or 10% of
the bank’s balance sheet (Repullo, 2005).  is set to 1 (Cordella and Yeyati, 2003) and the capital
ratio E is assumed to be at the minimum Basel II requirement, which is 8% of risk weighted assets.
We assume that the risky asset I gets a 100% weight.
Figure 1 shows that investment and the solvency threshold are indeed negatively related, as an
increase in investment means a decrease in liquidity buﬀers. We also see that the probability of
success and the solvency threshold are positively related. This means that an increase in invest-
ment should be met with an increase in its success probability to keep the threshold at the same
level. The bank will thus face a trade-oﬀ between investment and risk-taking if it wants to induce
the CB to set the optimal solvency threshold. In the end, this leads to a threshold xl > x, with
Il > In but pl < pn: there is more productive investment, but this goes with increased risk taking.
In this section, we have abstracted from penalty rates for emergency liquidity. Although this
is one of Bagehot’s key arguments, there are some issues with this view. One problem is that it
may be rather diﬃcult for a CB to commit to these penalty rates, especially in times of crisis.
This is exempliﬁed in the recent ﬁnancial crisis, where the ECB, Fed and other central banks have
provided liquidity far below market rates. Another problem is that banks may internalize this
penalty rate by taking higher risk ex ante; the higher expected return in the good state will then
compensate for higher expected LLR payments in the bad state (Repullo, 2005).
Furthermore, the concept of "creative ambiguity" has been introduced (by i.e. Freixas (1999))
as a possible solution to mitigate moral hazard. However, this concept also suﬀers from commit-
ment problems, as Freixas (1999) already noted himself: it may cause a Too-Big-to-Fail problem.
Cordella and Yeyati (2003) have also shown that committing explicitly has a possible "[charter]
value" eﬀect that may outweigh the moral hazard eﬀect. Acharya and Yorulmazer (2007, 2008)
ﬁnd similar results for systemically important banks.
We thus abstract from penalty rates and the "creative ambiguity" principle, and instead focus
on a situation in which the regulator will bail out the bank by injecting capital (as the bank is a
systemic one). At the same time, the regulator can determine what cost will be attached to this
assistance. We will analyze this situation in the next section.
4.4 The possibility of bailout
After analyzing the case where a bank goes simply bankrupt when a crisis occurs (x > x), we
will now introduce the possibility of the FA injecting capital into the bank to possibly mitigate
excessive risk taking. When doing so, the FA will stipulate its required share in the equity returns
16at t = 2. This is denoted by . While in the previous section this  was set equal to 1, it is now
possible for the FA to let the bank keep a share of its proﬁts when a crisis occurs. However, the
FA can discipline the bank for taking too much risk by setting a high .
It is assumed that the ﬁscal authority gets supervisory information from the central bank.
Therefore, the bank and the FA, just as the bank and the CB, play a simultaneous Nash game
with incomplete information. We will assume additionally that the CB and the FA observe each
other’s actions, but take them for granted; there is no interaction between the CB and the FA.
The bank again chooses risk-taking and the amount of investment in this new situation by
setting p and I, with equilibrium values pc and Ic. The c indicates that we have added the
possibility of capital provision. Furthermore, the ﬁscal authority chooses the repayment fraction
such that it breaks even in expectation. This means that it chooses  = , with equilibrium value
c. The  is determined by the following equation, where we can see it depends on the bank’s
actual choice of I, but only on its equilibrium choice of p, which is pc:
 ≡
xD − 1 + I − pcC
pc[(R(pc) − 1)I + E]
(26)
For the bank, this  will be a function of the expectation of x, conditional on x > x: E(x) =
1








1) − 1)I + E]
(27)
The bank’s objective function in the case of bailout possibility is thus as follows:
max
p;I
E(   V (p;I)2) = p[(R(p) − 1)I + E][1 − E()[1 − x]] (28)
which is optimized according to the following FOCs:
R(pc) + pc





(R(pc) − 1)[1 − c(1 − xc)] − [(R(pc) − 1)Ic + E]
[
@c






where xc = x(pc;Ic) and c = (pc;Ic). It is not straightforward to write an explicit solution for
both pc
1 and Ic
1 from these conditions. However, we can see that the FOC for pc is similar to that
of pl; the only diﬀerence is that Ic may diﬀer from Il.
To gauge the eﬀect of having the possibility of bailout on I and p, let us again perform
17comparative statics. Since the introduction of a bailout possibility means that  < 1 (as opposed
to  = 1), our analysis should focus the eﬀect of this change. As in section 4.3, we perform





















Inequality (32) holds because of equation (29), I ≥ 0 and the assumptions on R(p). However, the
sign of equation (31) is not unambiguous; it depends on the sign of the denominator (since the
numerator, representing a part of expected bank value, is positive). We see that this sign depends
on the relative size of pc
1(R(pc
1) − 1) and the equilibrium c. To assess the eﬀect of a possible
bailout, we thus need to consider two situations.
First, when c is relatively large, pc
1(R(pc
1) − 1)c > 1
2 and we ﬁnd a negative eﬀect of an
increase in  on investment. The c is large when  is small, meaning that the regulator cares
little about bankruptcy. This leads to a strict FA, which will to discipline banks ﬁercely when in
a crisis by making capital assistance very costly.
The bank owner takes into account that he will thus lose a large share in period 2 proﬁts. An
increase in this expected repayment will induce him to invest less in risky assets and keep more
reserves to fend oﬀ liquidity shocks. As  → 1 and we move towards the case without an FA,
we thus see that investment decreases. This means that the introduction of an FA with bailout
capabilities (and  < 1) can stimulate productive investment: Ic > Il.
There is also a downside to having a regulator that can provide bailout assistance. Because
of equation (32) we also see that the banker takes more risk when investment increases: the pc
decreases with I. This is the negative eﬀect of the introduction of a strict FA. It is similar to the
moral hazard eﬀect that may ensue when penalty rates on liquidity are introduced: the banker
will compensate the higher expected repayment with higher risk taking, to increase the return
when investment is successful.
However, the eﬀect is reversed when c is relatively small (pc
1(R(pc






d > 0 which means that investment decreases when an FA is introduced (decreasing  to
c ≪ 1). A reason for this small c may be a large , which means that the FA’s political cost of
a bank failure is large. This will thus lead to a small required repayment, which ex ante provides
the banker with a relatively high expected return.
Counterintuitively, a small c leads to a lower level of investment: the bank’s optimal payoﬀ
is reached at Ic < In. Investing more than Ic in the risky asset is considered as "gambling" by





dIc < 0). As c is quite small, investments have a higher expected return. Less risk
taking is thus necessary to achieve the optimal bank value at t = 2.
Table 1: The eﬀect of having an FA on I and p
Low  High 
Investment + -
Success Probability - +
Table 4.4 summarizes the diﬀerent situations described above. An FA that cares little about
bankruptcy (low ) demands a large repayment for banks in a crisis, leading to an increase in
investment, but also an increase in risk taking. On the other hand, an FA that cares a lot about
bankruptcy (high ) demands a small repayment from crisis banks, thereby decreasing productive
investment but also mitigating risk taking.
Figure 2 shows the case of an FA that is much concerned about bankruptcy. This is probably
the most realistic case, especially since we consider the bank to be systemic. In this situation 
is relatively high; in our set of parameter assumptions we have set  = 2. This means that the
weight the FA attaches to bankruptcy is twice as large as that of the CB10. It also means that c
is relatively low11. We can clearly see that keeping c low can lead to a low I, but a higher p and
thus less risk taking. It is especially interesting to see that an increase (as well as a decrease) in
risk taking is met with a punishment for the banker by increasing c.
We can conclude that a high  can mitigate risk taking, but also causes a decrease in investment;
a low  induces more risk taking, but has a positive eﬀect on investment. Regulatory authorities
thus face a trade-oﬀ when establishing regulation in the form of a safety net. They have to decide
whether they attach more value to an increase in investment, or to a decrease in risk taking. This
seems to be realistic: the current nationalization, bailout and guarantee eﬀorts by government
have led banks to mitigate their risk taking, while at the same time they have cut back on (risky)
lending to entrepreneurs.
10The exact size of this number is not very important; with  = 1 we get a similar result, but it is much more
pronounced for  = 2.
11Only at the top left we see the situation where dI=d < 0, caused by a very high c. Since we only consider
cases with too low p and pfb = 0:71 with our parameter values, this extreme range is not relevant.
195 Conclusion
The ongoing ﬁnancial crisis has provoked governments and central banks to supply unusually large
amounts of capital and liquidity to banks. Regard for systemic stability is the main motivation
with which this support to the ﬁnancial system has been provided. However, the risk for ﬁnancial
stability (ultimately leading to the ﬁnancial crisis) has arisen because of excessive risk taking
by individual institutions that were central to the system. Since they thus posed a risk for the
ﬁnancial system as a whole, regulators had no choice but to prevent them from failing.
Because of the enormous costs that are associated with ﬁnancial system failure, but also with its
prevention, it is necessary to thoroughly assess the management of crises by regulatory authorities.
In our analytical model, we have thus simultaneously allowed for liquidity provision (by a central
bank) and capital assistance (by a ﬁscal authority) to examine how they interact with a bank
facing a crisis.
We have assessed this interaction for a systemic bank suﬀering from liquidity shocks, with
which it can only cope by keeping liquid reserves. There is no interbank market in our model,
reﬂecting a crisis situation in which the interbank market does not function well. We ﬁnd that
being in this situation without any regulation leads a bank to hoard too much liquid assets and
take too much risk, compared to the ﬁrst best situation.
The introduction of a liquidity provider in the form of a central bank (CB) should alleviate this
problem. This CB has no information other than the bank’s investment level. It cannot observe
the bank’s choice of risk ex ante and can thus not condition its Lender of Last Resort (LLR)
policy upon this information. We ﬁnd that this measure indeed induces a higher investment level.
However, the introduction of a safety net also increases moral hazard as found by Freixas (1999).
To improve the situation, we set up a second regulator in the form of a ﬁscal authority (FA)
that is responsible for the bank closure decision. However, it can also decide to give the bank a
capital injection if it deems the bank solvent. This FA has the same information as the CB. We
ﬁnd that this set-up leads to a trade-oﬀ between mitigating risk and promoting investment. When
the FA is mild in its bailout conditions (demanding a low repayment) it can, counterintuitively,
reduce moral hazard at the expense of investment. A strict FA achieves the opposite result: the
investment level is higher, but there is an increase in moral hazard.
We must conclude that an additional regulatory authority with responsibility for solvency is
not a completely satisfactory solution for curbing excessive risk taking. This result is in line with
the current situation: although banks take less risk, they provide less credit to the economy partly
due to the terms of their rescue packages. Furthermore, relative eﬀects of CB and government
policies are also likely to play a role: central banks continue to provide liquidity to stimulate
lending, while banks are hoarding liquid reserves as the government induces them to reduce risk.
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